Activity, I attempted to survey the extent to which recent consumer behavior would have been "understood" by some of the principal U.S. forecasting models in the absence of concurrent errors emanating from other sectors of the economy.' At that time, I concluded that the errors in forecasting that reflected most seriously on the structure and composition of the typical forecasting equations concerned consumer durable expenditures, particularly for automobiles. An attempt to improve the explanatory power and forecasting ability of a stock-adjustment automobile equation by incorporating a household wealth variable was notably unsuccessful.
little if any part.2 If changes in consumer sentiment affect expenditures, and if the pattern of changing sentiment is adequately accounted for by the other, commonly used variables, then the absence of a direct sentiment variable is of little consequence. If the second proviso is false, however, then the forecasting equations in common use are-at best-adequate only when consumer sentiment is in some sense average or normal.3 Since it is nearly axiomatic that the past few years have been abnormal from an economic point of view, this seems a particularly appropriate time to question the adequacy of the standard sentiment-free equations.
The next section of the paper deals with an attempt to explain the systematic changes in consumer sentiment in order to permit the use of a consumer sentiment index in the forecasting of durable expenditures. The following two sections deal with expenditures on automobiles and on other durables, setting out explanatory equations and testing them on postsample data for 1969 and 1970. The paper concludes with projections of consumer durable expenditures through 1972 corresponding to likely alternative paths of economic growth, inflation, and the stock market.
The Index of Consumer Sentiment
For more than two decades the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan has been gathering data intended to measure the mood ers are well adjusted, then the ratio measures any deviation from that average and thus the immediate tone of business conditions that may be thought to have a significant impact on consumer sentiment.
2. The rate of increase of common stock prices in the preceding quarter. 3. The rate of increase of a lagged four-quarter average of common stock prices. This is intended to measure the underlying market trend, whereas variable (2) measures more transitory movements in the stock market.
4. The ratio of consumer prices to an eight-quarter average of consumer prices. The reasoning here is analogous to that given for the income ratio. Persistent inflation, of course, would be expected to dampen consumer sentiment.9 Table 1 presents the results of using these variables to explain changes in consumer sentiment. Each of them clearly plays a significant role in the empirical determination of the sentiment index; taken together with the lagged index, they explain nearly 80 percent of the variation in ICS. Equation (4) has two additional characteristics to recommend it. Once all four variables have been included, the importance of the lagged dependent variable is substantially diminished, and the constant term becomes insignificant-as it should be since there is no discernible trend in the ICS series. 10 The usefulness of equation (4) as a predictor of the ICS is established as follows: A series of simple equations involving only income, changes in income or averages of income, and a strike-period variable were fitted to explain consumer expenditures on automobiles. In each case the lagged ICS was a significant additional variable, as discovered earlier by Mueller 9. It is possible that inflation might dampen consumer sentiment but hasten consumer spending. In a test for this possibility in the context of the automobile expenditures model described in the next section, no empirical support could be found.
10. The ICS is available sporadically before 1961:4, and as a continuous quarterly series after that date. Equations (1) Table 2 . Note first that the use of ICSHAT and NOISE in place of ICS has essentially no impact on the income coefficient or any summary statistic. The coefficient of ICSHAT in equation (6) is practically the same Table 2 . That ICS is an important addition to equations using income alone is no longer a sufficient recommendation.
The Determination of Auto Expenditures
It is generally agreed that expenditures on durable goods are best explained in a so-called stock-adjustment framework. In such a setting, the "desired," or equilibrium, stock of a durable commodity is taken to depend on certain economic variables, such as income and prices. Gross expenditure on the commodity is then taken to depend on the diSference between the desired stock and the stock already available as a result of prior purchases, and on the need to replace old stock as it wears out. For the case of automobile expenditures, the model may be formulated as follows. The desired stock KA * is given by 15. Because the lagged stock contains the lagged value of the dependent variable, the serial correlation coefficient was calculated using residuals generated from equation Table 3 ). A final result worth noting has to do with the direct influence of stock prices. The average stock-price ratio used above to explain the sentiment index was introduced into the auto equation as a term multiplied by income. The interpretation of such a construction is that persistently rising stock prices raise the desired ratio of auto stock to income. This could occur either via the mechanism of improved consumer sentiment, or, alternatively, as the reflection of a wealth effect whereby a given measured income represents higher permanent income the higher the average rate of increase of stock prices. The results are given in equation (13). The root mean square errors are shown in Table 4 . Table 6 . These should not be interpreted as real forecasts, but rather as projections conditional on the benchmark forecast specified in Table 5 Table 6 therefore follows from the existence in 1970 of a large stock overhang relative to the stockincome position that had prevailed several years earlier. In other words, the income growth projected for the next year and a half is simply not great enough to justify a further rapid growth of the auto stock from the substantial base already in existence at the start of the forecast period.
In fact, the actual expenditure levels of 1969 could not have been fully explained by the behavior of income, employment, and prices during that year. By the end of 1968, the ratio of auto stock to income had already risen to 82 percent and, as can be seen in Table 7 , all of the auto equations underpredicted automobile expenditures as they attempted to react to an already large catch-up of the stock-income ratio. One might predict that 1970-71 will escape the bearish implications of a relative stock overhang, since 1969 managed to do so. This seems a weak argument. Auto spending did not rise much during 1969; it merely remained on a high plateau, and it declined in the first half of 1970. This pattern may well have marked the very beginning of the overhang effect. An alternative explanation-namely, that a permanent structural change occurred in the late 1960s-could be offered, but several years must pass before such a conjecture can be subjected to empirical evaluation. Returning to the assumptions of the benchmark forecast, it may well be argued that the income-unemployment scenario in Table 5 should be accompanied by somewhat more headway against inflation and a greater recovery in stock prices. Source: Derived by author using data in Table 8 .
provement in consumer sentiment, which now regains its early 1969 level in 1972.
The auto market is slightly improved, especially as viewed by equation (13), but the increases are distinctly small. This and other similar experiments clearly lead to the conclusion that the price and sentiment variables can vary within broad but likely ranges and still produce only "marginal" changes in consumer spending. It should be noted, however, that these changes-while small in actual magnitude-may not be all that small in comparison with the forecasting errors typically made (and subject to magnification through large multiplier effects) by quarterly forecasting models.
Variation of the income assumptions embodied in the benchmark forecast-again within a likely range-produces heavier impacts on durable expenditures. Table 10 contains the income and employment data corresponding to a somewhat stronger economic forecast for the period after 1970. Such a stronger growth of total demand would have to originate outside the auto sector. The price assumptions are the same as those in the benchmark forecast, not because that is reasonable, but in order better to isolate the income-employment effects on expenditure. It is clear that by the second half of 1971, the stronger growth assumptions have produced a markedly higher level of spending on consumer durables (compare Tables 6 and 11 ). Further, comparison of Tables 6, 9, and 11 reveals that the effects of the income-employment changes (as specified) on consumer sentiment are much weaker than the price effects previously specified. Table 5 ). a. Based on data in billions of 1958 dollars.
Nearly all of the greater strength of the auto performance in Table 11 is therefore due to the more rapid growth in income embodied in the higher growth forecast. In the event that such growth should materialize, it would help to alleviate the stock effect and 1972 would likely witness a rebound in 
Conclusions
Economists who make substantial use of sentiment variables, stock market changes, and other such non-real (as distinct from unreal) quantities in their own forecasts of consumer spending tend to shun the structural stock-adjustment framework preferred by the majority of econometric forecasters. The latter, in turn, have tended to reject the complex of stock market-sentiment-expectational variables as of dubious value and in any case unpredictable. There no longer appear to be many good reasons to maintain this dichotomy of approaches.
Changes in consumer sentiment-if properly filtered-do improve the forecasting accuracy of a stock-adjustment model of automobile expenditures. It is apparently possible to forecast ahead at least one quarter (and perhaps further investigation will suggest still longer) on the basis of the current quarter's sentiment index. It is also possible to forecast the systematic component of the sentiment index one quarter ahead with the aid of current stock market prices, thus permitting an auto forecast at least two quarters ahead without a forecast of stock market prices. Beyond this, the need to forecast the stock market may well establish the practical limit of the usefulness of the sentiment index in auto forecasting, except for conditional projections of the kind undertaken in the previous section. Nonetheless, the potential of meaningful improvement in forecasting accuracy for two quarters into the future is not to be taken lightly. Many four-quarter forecasts would have been much more accurate if only the errors present in the first quarter or two of the forecast could have been measurably reduced. 
Long-term Elasticities in the Auto

Comments and Discussion
Gardner Ackley: I have always felt that consumers' attitudes and psychology somehow must be important in consumer spending, that they must have some role in fluctuations of sales of durables and in fluctuations of the savings rate. I am, of course, glad to have this view confirmed. I still find a few puzzles in the explanation. As the paper shows, and as we have known for a long time, the consumer sentiment index does improve the explanation of either total consumer expenditures or consumer durables expenditures when it is used in a simple model along with income. The first finding of this paper, however, is that consideration of consumer sentiment does not aid the explanation in a "more sophisticated model" including the automobile stock, relative prices, and the unemployment rate. I am unable to understand why the stock-adjustment process and relative price elasticity somehow took the place of the index of consumer sentiment in explaining consumer expenditures. Obviously, stock adjustment and relative prices belong in a better explanation of consumption, but they neither are explained by, nor clearly do they explain, consumer sentiment. Rather, they are quite independent of it.
The only conclusion I can reach is that somehow the role of sentiment in the simpler model was entirely spurious, since it was replaced by factors that apparently had nothing to do with sentiment. My first suspicion was that the unemployment rate was somehow picking up the role of the sentiment variable in the more sophisticated model. For a given total of real disposable income, a higher rate of unemployment may imply a different distribution of income; but that distribution of income is not obviously more conducive to selling automobiles.
It seems to me that the role of unemployment in this equation has to be related somehow to psychological considerations-people who still are 200 working feel increasingly insecure because of the rise in the unemployment of others. Perhaps the principal justification for including an unemployment variable is purely pragmatic: Everybody does it in an automobile equation and it works. I am still not entirely satisfied. I would like to ask whether the unemployment rate was tried as one of the explanatory variables of the consumer sentiment index, and whether it should not be considered.
It seems somewhat surprising-after being told that the index of consumer sentiment is reasonably satisfactorily explained by real variables, and that it adds significantly to the explanation of consumption in a simple, naive model-to learn that only substantial variations in the consumer sentiment index matter, whereas the other movements are meaningless for forecasting. I would feel happier if it were shown either that the real variables that are used to explain the consumer sentiment index do a better job explaining the filtered index than they do the unfiltered index and/or that the filtered index works better in the simple model than does the unfiltered index.
Finally, I continue to be puzzled by the projections at the end of the paper. For something as cyclically volatile as auto sales, the behavior of these predicted auto sales seems to be terribly stodgy. In the low benchmark forecast, real disposable income is up roughly 9 percent between the second half of 1969 and the second half of 1972, but auto sales on any of the equations are at best just back to the 1969 level. Even in the higher growth forecast, in which the unemployment rate gets back to its level in the second half of 1969, the best one can say is that it will be the highest quarter auto sales ever had, and that is not good enough for me. Its inclusion is essential when it is going either up or down significantly because that is precisely when the other variables will not capture the change in uncertainty that is taking place and the impact of that change on automobile sales.
That is basically the analytical structure of the filtered variable. The decision rules are quite arbitrary. Anybody can fiddle with them and find a better set, but it won't make very much difference empirically. The filtered variable is designed to provide an empirical measure of the notion that changing uncertainty is significant in equations with variables that explain behavior in the absence of changing uncertainty; but that it is unnecessary and even detrimental to those same equations when no appreciable change is going on. I found, incidentally, it works very well in a somewhat simpler model of automobile demand than Hymans'.
Second, I'd like to offer an explanation for the finding that the sentiment variable does not help explain expenditures on household durables. My explanation is simply that these expenditures are not discretionary. We tend to think of purchases of durables as discretionary because they seem postponable. But a washing machine costs $225 or $250-only a third of a month's salary for a great many Americans-and it is like the car insurance bill in magnitude. It is not a big-ticket item, and in that sense should not be viewed as in a discretionary category. Consequently, variables like consumer sentiment will not play much role. One other comment on the joint use of expectational and anticipatory variables with regular objective variables: Improved results could, I think, come from a model that uses two expectational variables-one on purchase plans and one on sentiment-in addition to objective factors. Experiments on such a model can be performed only since 1960, when the Census launched the quarterly survey that gave us the first regular and reliable measure of purchase plans. Some results obtained for the period 1960-67 are in a paper that will soon be available.' They suggest that purchase expectations reflect essentially all the adjustment of demand to changes in income, the filtered sentiment variable reflects changes in uncertainty, and unemployment rates reflect events that are unforeseen in purchase plans and not captured by the filtered sentiment variable. The results with just these three variables for automobiles are an improvement over those that I have been able to obtain with any set of objective variables, including ones with a variety of distributed lags. It is also interesting that the relative price variable seems to remain relevant-it is not replaced by the survey variables. One interpretation that I am quite prepared to accept is that prospective buyers typically enter the auto market with only a vague notion of price, and the actual price they find is apt to be a surprise. 
General Discussion
One strand of the general discussion focused on the practical application to forecasting of the findings about the filtered sentiment index. It was generally agreed that the usefulness was limited to a fairly short horizon of prediction. Yet it is possible, in principle, to forecast the sentiment index and use that prediction in the auto forecast. David Fand suggested, however, that the sentiment index might be a particularly difficult variable to predict. Saul Hymans said that last quarter's value of the sentiment index is sufficient for a forecast of next quarter's automobile consumption; furthermore, this quarter's variables permit a satisfactory forecast of next quarter's sentiment index, and thus make it possible to forecast auto demand two quarters ahead. That may be the practical limit to the usefulness of the sentiment index. A two-quarter forecast of the sentiment index would require a one-quarter prediction of stock market prices, among other things.
Several discussants commented on the role of relative prices in Hymans' model. Alan Greenspan pointed to the long history of a downward trend in auto prices, relative to other prices. Since relative prices were the only variable moving down over time, they might be acting as proxies for some other long-term forces with a negative impact on automobile spending. Lawrence Klein said that the price elasticities looked rather small, in comparison with his own estimates and in light of other evidence. He interpreted the move toward imported cars as offering some gross evidence of sensitivity to price. Moreover, calculations attempting to measure quality change more specifically by the "hedonic index" approach would suggest that car prices have fallen a lot more than the official price indexes show. R. J. Gordon noted that the Bureau of Labor Statistics seemed to be devoting increasing effort to adjustment of prices of automobiles for quality change, but does not seem to be matching that effort in the case of other commodities; this could affect the series on relative prices and the estimates of price elasticity.
Both Klein and R. J. Gordon noted the omission of any variable for credit market conditions in Hymans's automobile forecasting model. Klein thought such a variable might be particularly important for understanding demand in the 1968-70 period of high interest rates. R. J. Gordon conjectured that ignoring credit variables might bias downward the estimated income or price elasticity. Klein also noted the desirability and the difficulty of including a variable to reflect the state of the used car market.
In answer to a query, Klein reported that the Wharton model would predict a somewhat more buoyant growth in auto sales in 1971-72 than did Hymans', if the other assumptions were the same. He guessed that the difference might be a couple of billion dollars-a little more than 5 percent.
There was considerable discussion of the way that rapid income growth from 1964 to 1968 could have generated unsustainably high rates of auto sales, given the high short-term income-elasticity of demand.
To Paul Samuelson, the bearish outlook for automobile demand presented by Hymans did not necessarily seem surprising. He noted: "Any dynamic system involving stock adjustment tends to go on huge roller coaster rides. We may be in the bad part of the cycle, when it goes below the trend. With the way stocks have built up in the past, they may now be quite large, and they could have a depressing effect on sales for some years to come." Alan Greenspan agreed with Samuelson. Like him, he did not find the results surprising. During the big buildup period, the key variables had been rising very rapidly, and they may well have generated an unsustainable growth rate.
